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Subadditive stake systems
Chunlei Liu∗
Abstract
We propose stake system which issues stakes as well as coins. Cash
systems can be viewed as stake systems. Two subadditive stake sys-
tems are studied: the radical stake system and the logarithmic stake
system. In both subadditive stake systems, an attacker would find it
very difficult to build the longest block-chain alone.
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Satoshi Nakamoto [Na] introduced the notion of block-chain
into P2P cash systems, giving birth to the famous Bitcoin, which is
the first P2P cash implemented in practise.
A cash system is a system which issues coins, and in which nodes
transfer coins to each other. A P2P cash system is a cash system with
a digital signature scheme in which transactions are digitally signed
and are broadcast to all nodes. A block-chain cash system with a hash
function B 7→ hash(B) and a threshold function B 7→ threshold(B) is
a P2P cash system, where transactions are collected into blocks, where
the hash of a block is contained in the next block so that the blocks
are chained one after another, where only the longest block-chain is
considered to correct, where a nonce is added to a block so that
hash(B) ≤ threshold(B), ∀B,
and where an amount of Rwd new coins are rewarded to a block creator.
A block-chain cash system is said to be based on proof of work if
threshold(B) =
M
D
, ∀B,
where M is the scale of the system, and D is the difficulty constant of
the system.
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A block-chain cash system is said to be based on proof of stake if
threshold(B) =M ·
bal(A;C) + Rwd
D
, ∀B,
where M is the scale of the system, D is the difficulty constant of the
system, A is the creator of B, C is the block-chain after which B is
chained, bal(A;C) is the balance of A in C, and Rwd is the amount of
new coins awarded to a block creator.
The block-chain cash system based on proof of stake have been stud-
ied by many authors [KN,BGM,NXT,Mi,BPS,DGKR,KRDO]. How-
ever, the block-chain cash system based on proof of stake seems vul-
nerable to long-term attacks, see, e.g. [Bu,Po].
We now propose stake systems. A stake system is a cash system
which issues stakes as well as coins, in which nodes transfer coins to
each other, and in which transaction fees are paid with coins. A P2P
stake system is a stake system with a digital signature scheme in which
transactions are digitally signed and are broadcast to all nodes. A
block-chain stake system with a hash function B 7→ hash(B), a coin-
issue threshold function B 7→ threshold(B), and a stake-issue thresh-
old function B 7→ stakthreshold(B) which is majored by the coin-issue
threshold function is a P2P stake system where transactions are col-
lected into blocks, where the hash of a block is contained in the next
block so that the blocks are chained one after another, where only the
longest block-chain is considered to correct, where a nonce is added to
a block so that
hash(B) ≤ cointhreshold(B), ∀B,
where an amount of CoinRwd new coins are rewarded to a block cre-
ator, and where an amount of StakRwd new stakes are rewarded to a
block creator if he has created a block, say B, which satisfies
hash(B) ≤ stakthreshold(B).
A block-chain cash system may be regarded as a block-chain stake
system whose stake-issue threshold is the same as its coin-issue thresh-
old, and in which stakes are never transferred to each other so that the
stakes of a node is just the product of Rwd and the times he has got
rewarded.
A block-chain cash system may also be regarded as a block-chain
stake system whose stake-issue threshold is the same as its coin-issue
threshold, and in which coins ever used to pay transaction fees lost
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their stakes so that the stakes of a node is the sum of the part of coins
he owned but is never used to pay transaction fees and the part of
transaction fees he has paid with coins which is used to pay transaction
fees for the first time.
2 CONSTANT STAKE SYSTEMS
A block-chain stake system is called a constant stake system if if
cointhreshold(B) =
M
CoinD
, ∀B,
and
stakthreshold(B) =
M
StakD
, ∀B,
where M is the scale of the system, CoinD and StakD are respectively
the coin-issue difficulty constant and the stake-issue difficulty constant
of the system.
The block-chain cash system based on proof of work may be regarded
as a constant stake system in which CoinD = StakD. It is easy to see
that a constant stake system is as secure as the block-chain cash system
based on proof of work.
3 LINEAR STAKE SYSTEMS
A block-chain stake system is called a linear stake system if
cointhreshold(B) =M ·
stak(A;C) + StakRwd
CoinD
, ∀B,
and
stakthreshold(B) =M ·
stak(A;C) + StakRwd
StakD
, ∀B,
where M is the scale of the system, CoinD and StakD are respectively
the coin-issue difficulty constant and the stake-issue difficulty constant
of the system, A is the creator of B, C is the block-chain after which
B is chained, stak(A;C) is the stake of A in C, and StakRwd is the
amount of new stakes awarded to a block-creator when the hash of the
created block is no greater than the stake-issue threshold.
Though a linear stake system is a little different from a block-chain
cash system based on proof of stake, it is still not resistant to long-term
attacks.
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4 RADICAL STAKE SYSTEMS
Let 0 < a < 1. A stake system is called a radical stake system with
equal exponent a if
cointhreshold(B) =M ·
(StakRwd + stak(A,C))a
CoinD
and
stakthreshold(B) =M ·
(StakRwd + stak(A,C))a
StakD
,
where M is the scale of the system, CoinD and StakD are respectively
the coin-issue difficulty constant and the stake-issue difficulty constant
of the system, A is the creator of B, C is the block-chain after which
B is chained, stak(A;C) is the stake of A in C, and StakRwd is the
amount of new stakes awarded to a block-creator when the hash of the
created block is no greater than the stake-issue threshold. We now
prove the following.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that a node, who conducts no transactions on
stakes with other nodes, is going to build a block-chain alone. Then
the expected time for the party to build a block-chain of length L in a
radical stake system with equal exponent a is
CoinD
StakRwda
L−1∑
n=0
n∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k,
where p = CoinDStakD , and q = 1− p.
Proof. Note that, after the node has built n blocks, the probability for
him to be rewarded with stakes k times is
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k. So the expected
time for the node to chain the (n+ 1)-th block is
n∑
k=0
CoinD
(k + 1)a · StakRwda
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
=
CoinD
StakRwda
n∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k.
It follows that the expected time for the node to build a long block-
chain of length L is
CoinD
StakRwda
L−1∑
n=0
n∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k.
The theorem is proved.
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Corollary 4.2 Suppose that a node, who conducts no transactions on
stakes with other nodes, is going to build a block-chain alone. Then
the expected time for the party to build a block-chain of length L in a
radical stake system with equal exponent a in which CoinD = StakD is
CoinD
StakRwda
L−1∑
n=0
1
(n+ 1)a
.
Proof. As CoinD = StakD, we have p = 1 and q = 0, and hence
n∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k =
1
(n+ 1)a
.
The corollary now follows.
Lemma 4.3 We have
n∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k ≤
1
p
·
1− qn+1
(n+ 1)a
.
Proof. We have
n∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
=
1
(n+ 1)a
n∑
k=0
(n+ 1)a
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
≤
1
(n+ 1)a
n∑
k=0
n+ 1
k + 1
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
≤
1
p
·
1− qn+1
(n+ 1)a
.
The lemma is proved.
Corollary 4.4 Suppose that a node, who conducts no transactions on
stakes with other nodes, is going to build a block-chain alone. Then
the expected time for the party to build a block-chain of length L in a
radical stake system with equal exponent a is no greater than
StakD
StakRwda
L−1∑
n=0
1
(n+ 1)a
.
The above corollary says that a node, who conducts no transactions
on stakes with other nodes and is going to build a block-chain alone,
gets no faster if he doesn’t add a new block to the block-chain until
the hash of the block is no greater than the stake-issue threshold.
5
Theorem 4.5 Suppose that a party with m ≥ 2 nodes is going to
build a block-chain. Assume that the party conducts no transactions
on stakes with nodes outside the party. Let Xi be the proportion of
stakes of the i-th node. Then the expected time for the party to build a
block-chain of length L in a radical stake system with equal exponent a
is no greater than
E((
m∑
i=1
Xai )
−1)
CoinD
StakRwda
L∑
n=1
n∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k,
where p = CoinDStakD , q = 1− p, and E((
∑m
i=1X
a
i
)−1) is the expectation of
(
∑m
i=1X
a
i
)−1.
Proof. Note that, after the party has built n blocks, the probability
that the party is rewarded with stakes k times is
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k. Let T be
the time for the party creates the (n+ 1)-th block with the unit time
being the time for a CPU to perform one operation. Then
P (T = t) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
∑
~x
f(~x)(α(~x)t−1 − α(~x)t),
where f(~x) is the probability mass function of the random variable
(X1, · · · , Xm), and
α(~x) =
m∏
i=1
(1 −
(1 + kxi)
aStakRwda
CoinD
).
So the expected time for the node to chain the (n+ 1)-th block is
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
∑
~x
f(~x)
CoinD∑m
i=1(kxi + 1)
a · StakRwda
Note that
kx+ 1 ≥ (k + 1)x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
So the expected time for the node to chain the (n + 1)-th block is no
greater than
≤
CoinD
StakRwda
n∑
k=0
1
(k + 1)a
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
∑
~x
f(~x)∑m
i=1 x
a
i
.
The theorem is proved.
Note that
E((
m∑
i=1
Xai )
−1) < 1.
6
Therefore by the above theorems, it is very difficult for an attacker to
build the longest block-chain alone. To get a sense of the degree of the
difficulty an attacker would face when he started to build the longest
chain, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6 Let Xi be the proportion of stakes of the i-th node in a
party with m nodes. Let c > 1. Suppose that the probability mass
function of (X1, · · · , Xm) vanishes at all points (x1, · · · , xm) for which
|{i | xi >
1
m
}| < cma.
Then
E((
m∑
i=1
Xai )
−1) ≤
1
c
.
Proof. Note that,
m∑
i=1
xai ≥ c whenever |{i | xi >
1
m
}| ≥ cma.
So
E((
m∑
i=1
Xai )
−1) ≤ E(
1
c
) ≤
1
c
.
The lemma is proved.
5 LOGARITHMIC STAKE SYSTEMS
A stake system is called a logarithmic stake system if
cointhreshold(B) =M ·
log2(StakRwd + stak(A,C))
CoinD
and
stakthreshold(B) =M ·
log2(StakRwd + stak(A,C))
StakD
,
where M is the scale of the system, CoinD and StakD are respectively
the coin-issue difficulty constant and the stake-issue difficulty constant
of the system, A is the creator of B, C is the block-chain after which
B is chained, stak(A;C) is the stake of A in C, and StakRwd is the
amount of new stakes awarded to a block-creator when the hash of the
created block is no greater than the stake-issue threshold. We now
prove the following.
7
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that a node, who conducts no transactions on
stakes with other nodes, is going to build a block-chain alone. Then
the expected time for the party to build a block-chain of length L in a
logarithmic stake system is
= CoinD
L−1∑
n=0
n∑
k=0
1
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k,
where p = CoinDStakD , and q = 1− p.
Proof. Note that, after the node has built n blocks, the probability for
him to be rewarded with stakes k times is
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k. So the expected
time for the node to chain the (n+ 1)-th block is
n∑
k=0
CoinD
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
= CoinD
n∑
k=0
1
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k.
It follows that the expected time for the node to build a long block-
chain of length L is
= CoinD
L−1∑
n=0
n∑
k=0
1
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k.
The theorem is proved.
Corollary 5.2 Suppose that a node, who conducts no transactions on
stakes with other nodes, is going to build a block-chain alone. Then
the expected time for the party to build a block-chain of length L in a
logarithmic stake system in which CoinD = StakD is
CoinD
L−1∑
n=0
1
log2(n+ 1) + log2 StakRwd
.
Proof. As CoinD = StakD, we have p = 1 and q = 0, and hence
n∑
k=0
1
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
=
1
log2(n+ 1) + log2 StakRwd
.
The corollary now follows.
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Lemma 5.3 We have
n∑
k=0
1
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
≤
1
p
·
1− qn+1
log2(n+ 1) + log2 StakRwd
.
Proof. Note that
log2(n+ 1) + log2 StakRwd
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
≤
n+ 1
k + 1
.
So
n∑
k=0
1
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
≤
1
log2(n+ 1) + log2 StakRwd
n∑
k=0
n+ 1
k + 1
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
≤
1
p
·
1− qn+1
log2(n+ 1) + log2 StakRwd
.
The lemma is proved.
Corollary 5.4 Suppose that a node, who conducts no transactions on
stakes with other nodes, is going to build a block-chain alone. Then
the expected time for the party to build a block-chain of length L in a
logarithmic stake system is no greater than
StakD
L−1∑
n=0
1
log2(n+ 1) + log2 StakRwd
.
The above corollary says that a node, who conducts no transactions
on stakes with other nodes and is going to build a block-chain alone,
gets no faster if he doesn’t add a new block to the block-chain until
the hash of the block is no greater than the stake-issue threshold.
Theorem 5.5 Suppose that a party with m ≥ 2 nodes is going to
build a block-chain. Assume that the party conducts no transactions
on stakes with nodes outside the party. Let Xi be the proportion of
stakes of the i-th node. Then the expected time for the party to build
a block-chain of length L in a logarithmic stake system is no greater
than
CoinD · E((
m∑
i=1
log2(1 +Xi))
−1)
L∑
n=1
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
,
where p = CoinDStakD , q = 1 − p, and E((
∑m
i=1 log2(1 + Xi))
−1) is the
expectation of (
∑m
i=1 log2(1 +Xi))
−1.
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Proof. Note that, after the party has built n blocks, the probability
that the party is rewarded with stakes k times is
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k. Let T be
the time for the party creates the (n+ 1)-th block with the unit time
being the time for a CPU to perform one operation. Then
P (T = t) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
∑
~x
f(~x)(α(~x)t−1 − α(~x)t−1),
where f(~x) is the probability mass function of the random variable
(X1, · · · , Xm), and
α(~x) =
m∏
i=1
(1 −
log2(1 + kxi) + log2 StakRwd
CoinD
).
So the expected time for the node to chain the (n+ 1)-th block is
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
∑
~x
f(~x)
CoinD∑m
i=1(log2 StakRwd + log2(kxi + 1))
.
Note that
log2(1 + kx) ≥ log2(1 + k)× log2(1 + x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
So the expected time for the node to chain the (n + 1)-th block is no
greater than
CoinD
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
∑
~x
f(~x)∑m
i=1 log2(1 + xi)
.
The theorem is proved.
Note that
E((
m∑
i=1
log2(1 +Xi))
−1) < 1.
Therefore by the above theorems, it is very difficult for an attacker to
build the longest block-chain alone. To get a sense of the degree of the
difficulty an attacker would face when he started to build the longest
chain, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.6 Suppose that a party with m > 2 nodes is going to build
a block-chain. Assume that the party conducts no transactions with
nodes outside the party. Let Xi be the proportion of stakes of the i-
th node. Let 1 < c ≤ mlog
2
(m+1) . Suppose that the probability mass
function of (X1, · · · , Xn) vanishes at all points (x1, · · · , xm) for which
|{i | xi >
1
m
}| < 2c log2m.
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Then the expected time for the party to build a long block-chain of
length L is no greater than
CoinD
c
L∑
n=1
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k
log2(k + 1) + log2 StakRwd
,
where p = CoinDStakD , and q = 1− p.
Proof. We claim that, if
|{i | xi >
1
m
}| ≥ 2c log2m,
then
m∑
i=1
(log2 StakRwd + log2(kxi + 1)) ≥ c(log2 StakRwd + log2(k + 1)).
First, if k ≤ m, then
m∑
i=1
(log2 StakRwd + log2(kxi + 1))
≥ m log2 StakRwd
≥ c(log2 StakRwd + log2(k + 1)).
Secondly, if k > m, then
m∑
i=1
(log2 StakRwd + log2(kxi + 1))
≥ m log2 StakRwd + 2c(log2m)(log2(k +m)− log2m)
≥ c(log2 StakRwd + log2(k + 1)).
The lemma now follows from the proof of Theorem 5.5.
6 CONCLUSION
We have proposed stake system which issues stakes as well as coins.
Two subadditive stake systems are studied: the radical stake system
and the logarithmic stake system. In both subadditive stake systems,
an attacker would find it very difficult to build the longest block-chain
alone.
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